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Studies on memory, imagination, and empathy have largely progressed in isolation. Conse-
quently, humans’ empathic tendencies to care about and help other people are considered
independent of our ability to remember and imagine events. Despite this theoretical auton-
omy, work from across psychology, and neuroscience suggests that these cognitive abilities
may be linked. In the present paper, I tentatively propose that humans’ ability to vividly
imagine specific events (as supported by constructive memory) may facilitate prosocial
intentions and behavior. Evidence of a relationship between memory, imagination, and
empathy comes from research that shows imagination influences the perceived and actual
likelihood an event occurs, improves intergroup relations, and shares a neural basis with
memory and empathy. Although many questions remain, this paper outlines a new direction
for research that investigates the role of imagination in promoting empathy and prosocial
behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
Every day there are families with an inept cat marooned in a tree,
friends with a couch to be moved, neighbors’ homes damaged by a
storm, pedestrians hit by a car: people in need of help. To the suffer-
ers’ benefit, other people tend to provide assistance, sometimes at a
great cost to personal welfare (Hein et al., 2010). Partly accounting
for why such selfless behaviors exist, some researchers have pro-
posed humans’ rampant evolutionary success is due to our species’
ability to understand,collaborate with,and help others (Tomasello,
2000; Nowak and Highfield, 2011). Contributing to these abilities
is our capacity for empathy. A term used to describe various con-
cepts in the social psychology literature, empathy is a multifaceted
construct that has included vicariously experiencing another per-
son’s emotions (affect-sharing), deliberately considering another
person’s perspective in order to understand their thoughts and
feelings (mentalizing), and a desire to improve another person’s
welfare (prosocial concern; Zaki and Ochsner, 2012). For the pur-
poses of this paper, I use empathy to imply the latter construct,
viewing the former two as means of – but not always – eliciting
empathy and prosocial behavior (Batson, 1991).
There are several factors known to modulate willingness to
help (e.g., closeness of a relationship, social norms), but predom-
inate among them is mentalizing the perspective of the person in
need. Adopting the other person’s perspective focuses our atten-
tion on how he or she is affected by an adverse situation, eliciting
an empathic feeling that then increases the perspective-taker’s
willingness to help (Batson, 1991; see, Epley et al., 2006; Barber
et al., 2010; for mentalizing conditions that elicit egotism). But
that might not always be the case. In contrast to mentalizing, a
path to facilitate helping that is less reliant on emotional con-
cern may come from episodic simulation, the ability to vividly
imagine specific personal events. While mentalizing and episodic
simulation are related in that both processes consist of a mental
shift away from the immediate environment and into hypotheti-
cal experiences (Buckner and Carroll, 2007), the content of those
hypothetical experiences differs across these processes. Whereas
mentalizing involves inferring mental states from another per-
son’s perspective, episodic simulation involves imagining scenarios
specific in time and place from a first-person perspective.
In recent years, the functional role of memory has extended
beyond remembering the past to include imagining the future
(Addis et al., 2007; Schacter et al., 2008; Szpunar, 2010). One
prominent theory, the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis,
posits that the cognitive raw materials of imagined future experi-
ences are bits and bobs of episodic memories (Schacter and Addis,
2007, 2009). The flexibility of constructive memory promotes the
recombination of details gleaned across past episodic experiences
into novel representations of future events that allow individuals
to readily confront previously un-encountered situations (Schac-
ter et al., 2008; Buckner, 2010). The adaptive function of imagining
events is thought to mainly derive from the opportunity to “test
out” one or more versions of what might happen by simulating
the outcome of anticipated future events. Simulation reduces the
cost of engaging in behavior while supporting planning and pre-
diction, which enables humans to learn from simulated missteps
without actually lifting a foot (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Gilbert
and Wilson, 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007; see, Schacter, 2012
for a comprehensive review). Here, I offer an additional function
for episodic simulation that has not previously been considered:
facilitating socially desirable actions.
In what follows, I selectively piece together work from across
the cognitive and social domains of psychology and neuroscience,
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marshaling support for the role of episodic simulation in under-
standing and helping others. First, I will review studies that
demonstrate imagination’s effect on the perceived likelihood that
an event will happen, an effect that is likely to extend to imagined
helping. Second, I will then look at recent promising work that
demonstrates imagination’s positive impact on empathy biases
against dissimilar others. Third, I will briefly examine the neural
basis of episodic simulation and empathy by highlighting overlap-
ping brain regions and contemplate the shared cognitive processes
these regions may support. Finally, I highlight what I think will
be productive avenues for future research exploring episodic
simulation’s contribution to empathy.
IMAGINING MAKES IT SO
Relief that people in need will receive is partially dependent on
the extent that others are willing to offer assistance; the more
willing someone is to help, the more likely the person in need
will gain relief. This point seems obvious, but it is easy to mis-
take self-evidence for inconsequence. While prosocial behavior is
pervasive it is by no means assured (Batson et al., 1997). Evalu-
ating one’s willingness to help in any meaningful way requires a
person to reflect on the perceived probability that he or she will
help someone. Although there is currently no direct evidence that
imagining helping increases willingness to help, there is relevant,
though mostly disconnected, work from the memory and social
judgment literatures.
Memory researchers have long been interested in the falli-
ble nature of memory, attempting to understand why memo-
ries are imperfect re-constructions, rather than literal reproduc-
tions, of past experiences (Bartlett, 1932; Schacter, 2001). In the
mid-1990s, studies on imagination inflation showed that imag-
ining a novel event increased the perceived likelihood that it
occurred in one’s past, and in some cases led to rich false mem-
ories of experiences that never occurred (Hyman and Pentland,
1996; Garry and Polaschek, 2000). Less interested in past events,
social psychologists have found that imagining hypothetical events
increases the perceived probability that the event will occur in the
future (Carroll, 1978; Anderson, 1983; Greenwald et al., 1987).
Examining decision-making heuristics, Carroll (1978) initially
demonstrated imagination’s influence on predictions. Prior to
the 1976 presidential election, subjects imagined events related
to either a Ford or Carter victory and later were instructed to
predict the likelihood that either candidate would win. The can-
didate that subjects imagined winning was rated more likely
to win.
More recent work has shown this effect for simulating specific
future social experiences (e.g., a family gathering, job interview,
or first date). Simulating the same experience multiple times
increased estimates of perceived plausibility for future experiences.
Further, ratings of simulated detail, ease, and emotional intensity
tracked with plausibility (Szpunar and Schacter, 2012). Although
relatively little is known about the neural basis of these imagination
inflation effects, tentative evidence from related work on imagi-
nation suggests that activity in the precuneus may drive increased
plausibility ratings (Weiler et al., 2010). Thus, imagining (possi-
bly mediated by the precuneus) makes it so, or at least makes it
seem so.
Critical to assessing the potential contribution of imagina-
tion to helping others is to determine imagination’s influence
on actual behavior. A recent study on voting intentions found
that imagination influenced self-perceptions (including perceived
probability of voting), which subsequently influenced the like-
lihood that the subject would vote a day later (Libby et al.,
2007). Consistent with the facilitating effect of imagined behav-
ior on actual behavior, other researchers found that imagination
increased estimated willingness to subscribe to a local cable com-
pany immediately following imagining the benefits and services
the company offered. Strikingly, 2–3 months later, imagination-
inflated estimates predicted actual subscriptions (Gregory et al.,
1982, experiment 4).
Currently, it remains unknown whether imagining helping oth-
ers will increase our willingness to help and subsequent helping
behavior. However, based on research from cognitive and social
psychology showing imagination’s facilitating effect on perceived
probability across a variety of situations, the effect will likely extend
to prosocial behavior. Despite an absence of research on imag-
ination inflation and empathy, a good deal is known about the
positive effect of imagination on intergroup relations, a topic I
turn to next.
IMAGINATION FOSTERS POSITIVE INTERGROUP RELATIONS
Human helping behavior is pervasive, but this empathic response
to alleviate another person’s suffering is diminished or absent when
the sufferer is a member of a different social, racial, or cultural
group (Cuddy et al., 2007; Cikara et al., 2011). To the betterment of
intergroup relations, however, several techniques have been shown
to reduce prejudice and empathy directed at outgroup members
(Batson and Ahmad, 2009). One particular effective technique for
improving intergroup attitudes and reducing prejudice involves
simply imagining a positive interaction with an outgroup member
(Crisp and Turner, 2009).
Imagined social contact offers a flexible and relatively minimal
manipulation that can elicit robust prosocial change. For example,
young subjects who spent 1 min imagining a positive interaction
with an elderly person showed reduced ingroup bias compared to
participants who imagined an outdoor scene or merely thought
about an outgroup member. Imagined contact reduced anxiety
about interacting with an outgroup member and increased will-
ingness to work with outgroup members (Turner et al., 2007).
Imagined contact may even promote intentions to engage in future
contact (Husnu and Crisp, 2010), and reduce implicit prejudice
(Turner and Crisp, 2010).
While imagined contact is a useful technique for improving
intergroup relations, it is unlikely to be as effective as face-to-face
contact (Turner et al., 2007). Part of the reason for this difference
may be that direct perception leads to relevant knowledge being
more cognitively available than imagined events (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1973). Perhaps the closer an imagined event approxi-
mates a genuine percept (i.e., the more coherent,vivid,and detailed
an event in the mind’s eye) the greater its cognitive and behavioral
sway would be (Anderson, 1983; Crisp et al., 2010). Therefore, if
one could boost the vividness and detail of an imagined intergroup
interaction, then perhaps the prosocial effectiveness of imagined
contact would be enhanced.
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Husnu and Crisp (2010) hypothesized that more elaborate
imagined contact would enhance intentions of future contact
with outgroup members and that subjective ratings of vividness
would mediate this enhancement. Elaboration was manipulated by
instructing subjects to specifically envision when and where they
would come into contact with an imagined outgroup member (i.e.,
high elaboration condition) in contrast with the previously used
imagined contact condition that did not require subjects to specify
when and where (i.e., low elaboration condition). The researchers
found that high elaboration increased vividness and intentions to
interact with outgroup members in the future. Furthermore, vivid-
ness predicted willingness to interact while controlling for changes
in attitude and anxiety. The more vivid an imagined event was, the
greater the willingness to interact.
Interestingly, the qualities of the event that were manipulated
for the purposes of elaboration closely resemble defining features
of episodic experiences: contextual and temporal specificity (Tulv-
ing, 2002). Based on studies of episodic memory and imagination
that have found greater hippocampal activity when more vivid
and detailed events are subjectively experienced (Addis et al., 2004;
Addis and Schacter, 2008), an intriguing possibility is that the hip-
pocampus may instantiate the effect of vividness on intergroup
cognition.
In regards to memory and intergroup relations, Husnu and
Crisp (2010) found that – irrespective of the elaboration condi-
tion – remembered past experiences positively predicted vividness
of imagined events and willingness to interact with outgroup
members in the future. This makes theoretical sense if, when
constructing imagined events, bits and bobs of episodic details
are gleaned across memories. Broadly consistent with the theo-
ries on imagination and memory (Ingvar, 1979; Tulving, 1985;
Schacter and Addis, 2007), memory appears to support – or at
least to enrich – imagination. And, it would seem, in the service of
prosocial behavior. It is worth noting, however, that the imagined
contact literature has relied heavily on self-reported measures of
prosocial behavior, causing some to question the practical signifi-
cance of these measures (Bigler and Hughes, 2010). This emerging
literature awaits further experiments using objective behavioral
measures. Yet, evidence from Turner and Crisp (2010) finding pos-
itive changes in implicit prejudice reduces some of these concerns
(Crisp and Turner, 2010). Thus far, I have largely focused on psy-
chological evidence that indicates a cognitive relationship between
memory, imagination, and empathy. Further support comes from
emerging evidence of a shared neural architecture.
A SHARED NEURAL BASIS
The neuroscience on memory and imagination has developed
largely independently from the neuroscience on social cognition
(broadly) and empathy (specifically). Although initial findings
from brain-damaged amnesic patients suggest that brain regions
supporting memory and imagination may not be necessary to
complete some mentalizing tasks (Rosenbaum et al., 2007), work
from various clinical populations (e.g., Lombardo et al., 2007) and
neuroimaging studies demonstrate that brain systems support-
ing memory and imagination may shape empathy. Demonstrating
a link between memory for personal experiences and empathy,
Lombardo et al. (2007) found that differences in self-referential
memory between autistic patients and healthy controls disap-
peared when measures of empathy were included as a covariate
(see also Corcoran and Frith, 2003; Lee et al., 2004 for co-morbid
deficits in schizophrenia). Conversely, independence across these
mental processes also exists. For example,older adults show dimin-
ished abilities to remember the past and imagine the future
(Addis et al., 2008; Gaesser et al., 2011), yet they exhibit pre-
served levels of trait empathy across the lifespan (Gruhn et al.,
2008). These behavioral findings underscore a complex relation-
ship between processes, suggesting that memory and imagination
may contribute to, but are distinct from, a capacity for empathy.
Here, I will briefly examine preliminary neuroimaging find-
ings that are beginning to subvert theoretical autonomy across
these processes, shedding light on a shared constellation of brain
regions within the default network, recruited for remembering and
imagining specific personal experiences as well as understanding
and empathizing with others. To the extent that the brain is func-
tionally localized, this anatomical overlap represents a cognitive
interaction across faculties, signifying contributions of one faculty
to another or component mental processes recruited by all facul-
ties (Henson, 2005; Bressler and McIntosh, 2007; Hein and Knight,
2008). These findings raise more questions than they answer and
pave the way for a promising new line of research.
While functional neuroimaging studies have provided initial
evidence of the neural overlap between memory, imagination, and
social cognition in the default network (Spreng et al., 2009; Spreng
and Grady, 2010; Spreng and Mar, 2012), unexamined in these
studies is the neural relationship of memory and imagination
with empathic concern and action. However, recent neuroimaging
studies are beginning to uncover commonalities.
Investigating the neural conditions that facilitate prosocial
thoughts and behavior, Masten et al. (2011) found that regions
of the default network were more strongly activated when subjects
viewed social exclusion (i.e., a person in need) during a ball-tossing
game compared to when they viewed social inclusion. Greater
activity was observed for the mPFC and precuneus when sub-
jects viewed social exclusion compared to inclusion. Further, after
controlling for trait empathy levels in an exploratory mediation
analysis, only activity in the mPFC positively predicted proso-
cial behavior (e.g., consoling the excluded player outside of the
scanner; see also Rameson et al., 2012; Waytz et al., 2012).
Investigating the neural substrates of an enhanced empathy
bias toward ingroup members relative to outgroup members,
Mathur et al. (2010) showed that, across individuals, the differ-
ence in mPFC activity when observing someone in need (e.g., in
a natural disaster) for ingroup versus outgroup members predicts
state empathy and willingness to donate money and time to help
ingroup members. Future work may want to investigate whether
instructions similar to those used in the aforementioned imag-
ined contact literature would boost mPFC activity and subsequent
helping behavior.
One possible explanation for the involvement of the mPFC
across these studies on empathy comes from its role in self-
referential processing (Amodio and Frith, 2006). Psychological
research has previously demonstrated that subjects who view a
person in need as more similar to themselves show heightened
empathetic concern for the similar-to-self person in need (Cialdini
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et al., 1997). Neuroimaging studies show the mPFC is preferentially
activated when mentalizing about similar and psychologically
close others (Krienen et al., 2010; Tamir and Mitchell, 2011; Denny
et al., 2012). Therefore, mPFC activity may support empathy to
the extent that it reflects a perceived self-other overlap, as greater
mPFC activity may indicate an increase in perceived self-other
similarity (Masten et al., 2011; Rabin and Rosenbaum, 2012).
The preceding studies typically interpret activity within the
default network as a proxy of mentalizing processing. However,
because similar regions are activated under conditions of episodic
simulation (Schacter et al.,2008), it could be the case that this activ-
ity represents constructing vivid scenarios rather than simulating
thoughts and feelings in some cases or perhaps shared component
processes, such as self-referential processing. Further investiga-
tion is needed to adequately tease apart the entangled relationship
across these cognitive processes in order to characterize the inde-
pendent or interactive contributions of episodic simulation and
mentalizing to prosocial cognition and behavior.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Humans are a preeminent evolutionary success story because we
work as a horde, a cognitively sophisticated and helpful horde.
Multiple cognitive tools are thought to support our prosocial ten-
dencies (Tomasello, 2000; de Waal, 2008). Prominent among these
tools are the capacity to infer others’ mental states and an empathic
emotional response to others’ plights (Batson, 1991). Here I have
outlined the speculative possibility that episodic simulation of spe-
cific vivid and coherent scenarios may also foster helping behavior.
Suggestive evidence from imagination inflation, imagined con-
tact, and the neuroscience of memory, imagination, and empathy
hints at a socially enhancing function for constructive memory
and imagination.
To be clear, I am not proposing the adaptive function of pro-
moting prosocial behavior to be mutually exclusive with other
proposed functions of episodic simulation (e.g., “trying out”
alternative scenarios in order to plan and predict the future).
Nor am I advocating that episodic simulation will always be
associated with prosocial behavior, but rather make the more
modest claim that it may support prosocial behavior in healthy
individuals and that promoting prosocial behavior may consti-
tute the primary advantage (Nowak and Highfield, 2011). It is
likely that imagination will only be beneficial to the extent that
these simulations accurately reflect reality. And, while simula-
tions of events can often be error prone (Dunning, 2007; Gilbert
and Wilson, 2007), I am encouraged by a recent meta-analysis
highlighting the relative accuracy of simulations (Mathieu and
Gosling, 2012). There may also be particular circumstances in
which episodic simulation could in fact reduce prosocial behav-
ior. If the content of the simulation is focused on negative
consequences associated with helping, such as damage to the
self, then simulation may reduce the likelihood of intervening.
Whether episodic simulation can be used to promote prosocial
behavior, and whether episodic simulation normally promotes
prosocial behavior are open questions of applied and theoretical
relevance.
Future research is needed to establish the parameters
under which episodic simulation may influence empathy and
prosocial behavior. Of theoretical importance will be delineat-
ing the contributions of episodic simulation from known mental
processes that influence prosocial behavior (e.g., mentalizing and
affect-sharing). It may be the case that episodic simulation facil-
itates helping as a result of interacting with perspective taking
or affect-sharing. For example, adopting a person in need’s per-
spective may very well guide imagining how to appropriately help
someone, or perhaps the facilitating effect of episodic simulation
will be partially attributed to making more cognitively available
the perspective of another person’s thoughts and feelings. How-
ever, these interactions are unlikely to fully account for an increase
in willingness to help to the extent that the effect of imagina-
tion inflation, which holds for non-social events, and the effect of
increased temporal and contextual specificity of an event (both
of which are definitional qualities of episodic simulation but not
of mentalizing or affect-sharing) improving intentions to interact
with outgroup members extend to helping behavior.
Identifying the precise degree of independence and interaction
between the scenario construction and self-referential aspects of
episodic simulation from traditional accounts of fostering empa-
thy is paramount to determining the contribution of episodic sim-
ulation to prosocial behavior. An interesting question is whether
episodic simulation could boost prosocial behavior in the absence
of the capacity for perspective taking. One possibility is that
semantic knowledge or episodic memories of past related helping
experiences could be used to guide or inform episodic simula-
tions of helping events without relying on perspective taking. For
instances, perhaps the semantic knowledge that slow elderly people
typically benefit from help crossing roads triggers an episodic sim-
ulation of how best to accompany a specific person upon observing
an elderly person, cane in hand, waiting on a street corner, thereby
promoting prosocial behavior.
Mechanistically, it remains unknown whether the effects of
imagination will be primarily mediated by vividness and detail of
the scenario (possibly substantiated in the hippocampus and pre-
cuneus), or by a self-other identity merging (possibly substantiated
in the mPFC), or by some combination of the two. Specifying the
effect of emotion is also of interest. Although mentalizing is well
known to promote prosocial behavior by increasing emotional
concern for others, there is currently no empirical evidence that
the facilitating influence of imagining would also operate through
emotional concern, but this does not dismiss a role for emotion
in some capacity mediating the influence of simulation on proso-
cial behavior. Indeed, the increase in perceived likelihood that an
imagined event will occur was restricted to emotional events in
Szpunar and Schacter (2012) and imagining a positive social tone
has been integral to eliciting imagined contact effects (Crisp and
Turner, 2009).
At this point we are left to speculate and await empirical inves-
tigation to substantiate and critically evaluate the ideas outlined in
this article. To the extent that a goal of society is to maximally fos-
ter these social abilities, identifying and examining all the mental
processes that influence empathy and prosocial behavior is criti-
cal. Psychology and neuroscience have already illuminated several
cognitive strategies for fostering empathy and prosocial behavior.
But I wonder if perhaps humans are equipped with at least one
more empathic tool: episodic simulation.
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